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Abstract
In this paper we develop a partial equilibrium model for agricultural sector to assess the 
impact of CEE integration with the EU on welfare and income distribution of agricultural 
factors. The modelling framework is based on the concept of market imperfections and 
transaction costs. We perform several policy simulations with different levels of direct 
payments as given in the most recent European Commission proposal. We find that even the 
most sceptical European Commission proposal of awarding the CEE farmers only 25% of the 
direct payments will increase welfare and income of farmers. However, the distribution of 
CAP rents are affected by the institutional structure. We find an adverse impact on allocation 
of incomes and welfare that are generated by the integration in Slovakia and in the Czech 
Republic. The major part of it - between 65% to 93% - is transferred to owners of production 
factors, such as hired labour, landowners and variable capital suppliers, but not as desired to 
support farmer incomes. In Poland the gains resulting from the integration are allocated more 
favourably to farmers. Factor owners retain only around 24% to 61%, depending on the level 
of direct payments. 
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1.INTRODUCTION
EU integration of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) will significantly 
change, among others, their current agricultural policies. First, the level of support to 
agriculture will increase for the majority of CEECs, and secondly the composition of the 
policy instruments will be affected. One of the most hotly debated issues on enlargement is 
whether the CEECs should get access to full CAP support, in particular the direct payments. 
Yet, no matter what decision is taken, agricultural policy changes with accession are likely to 
change the income distribution and welfare in CEECs. 
There is a growing literature on the impact of EU enlargement of CEECs in 
agriculture. Recent studies asses the impact on EU budgetary expenditures, on CEECs' 
protection levels (Banse et al. (2000), Hartell and Swinnen (2000), Hertel et al. (1997)), and 
on commodity markets, trade and WTO and the macroeconomy (Munch (2000), Hertel et al. 
(1997)), Banse (2000)). However, the impact of accession on factor markets and on income 
distribution is less explored. This is surprising given the prominence of these arguments in 
the debate and whether or not CEEC farmers should get access to full CAP subsidies, 
including direct payments.  
The impact of the enlargement on the agricultural factors' incomes was in majority 
studies deduced based on the output developments. However, the distribution of income to 
the factors employed in agriculture, or the distribution of the farmers' income versus the other 
factors' income, is more complex and requires to incorporate a more detailed factor markets 
structure into the model. For instance, in an agricultural sector where the outsiders own the 
most of the agricultural land and also the majority of labour is hired, the increase of output 
does not necessary lead to a same increase of the farmers' income. Consequently, the share of 
farmers' income in the total agricultural income may be adversely affected. The land rents 
relative to the prices of the other factors may increase and the factors supplied by the farmers 
are usually less responsive to a price change compared to factors supplied by the outsiders; 
thus providing a change in farmers' income that differs from that of the output change. 
Further, the issue of imperfect factor markets, extensively emphasised in the general literature 
and in the policy debate, is addressed by none of the above papers. Credit is usually not easily 
accessible to farmers - they are rationed - and concerning the agricultural land market is 
working imperfectly in CEECs, due to institutional constraints. 3
This paper presents the first attempt (a) to asses income distribution effects within the 
CEECs economies of CAP accession, and (b) to analyse how factor market imperfection 
affect the outcome. For this we use an empirical model to evaluate the effect of introducing 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on the income distribution and welfare of the owners 
of agricultural production factors (land, labour and capital) in Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia after joining the EU. As a first approach, the model is partial equilibrium, single 
product and static. The model explicitly models transaction costs and credit rationing to 
integrate imperfections in land and credit markets. 
The three countries were chosen because they are expected to be among the first 
group that will join the EU and because they have very different farm structures, which 
allows to incorporate the impact of this variation in the analysis (see tables 1-3). Poland is 
representative for the countries where the farm sector is dominated by individual family 
farmers, such as Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. Slovakia represents the other 
extreme, where the farm sector is dominated by large corporate farms i.e. partially 
transformed collective and state farms. The Czech Republic is somewhere in between with a 
dualistic farm structure, where individual farms as well as large corporate farms are operating 
in the agricultural sector. Hungary, Estonia and Bulgaria also have such dualistic structures. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section gives a short description of the 
situation of the agricultural sector in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The model 
description is presented in section three. The fourth section discuses the results and the last 
section summarises. 
2.AGRICULTURE IN POLAND, THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA
  The agricultural sector, as can be seen from table 4, is more important in the overall 
economy of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia than it is in the EU. The share of 
agricultural production, the share of agricultural employment and the share of food 
consumption on the total economy are at higher levels for all three CEECs when compared to 
EU-15 average. The most substantial difference is in agricultural employment in Poland, 
where a significant portion of the Polish population derives its income from the agricultural 
sector. Its share of the total employment is about four times higher than the EU average, 
while for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, these values are higher just by a factor of less 4
then two. The two other indicators - share of total agricultural production of the GDP and 
share of food consumption on total expenditure - do not differ by a such high margin, as in 
the case of Polish agricultural labour, but they are still higher by a factor ranging from 1.5 to 
2.3 compared to EU average.  
  In the development of agricultural production during the transition, two periods can 
be distinguished for the three CEECs. The first period is immediately after the fall of 
Communism, around 1989-1994, when agricultural production had declined dramatically, 
reaching in 1993 only around 60% to 80% of the corresponding figure in 1989 (figure 1). 
This was mainly caused by deep structural changes that took place at that time, especially 
privatisation, liberalisation and substantial decrease in agricultural protection. The paper of 
Macours and Swinnen (2000) found that almost half of the output decline can be attributed to 
price liberalisation and to subsidy cuts. Other important factors found to be relevant in 
explaining these output developments were transition uncertainty, drought, each explaining 
around 10%, and privatisation. The second period is after 1994, when production stabilisation 
to new relative prices and economic environment seems to have taken place. This 
stabilisation is relevant for selection of the base year for the model calibration. Otherwise, if 
too many disequilibria existed in those economies, then calibrated parameters may be 
misleading.  
  Regarding the farm structure, all three countries differ substantially, both among 
themselves and with respect to EU-15 average as well. The Polish farm sector is fragmented 
into a large number of small family farms totalling around 2 million and averaging 7 hectares 
per farm (table 1). On the other hand, agriculture in Slovakia is dominated by large farms, 
predominately former co-operatives or joint stock and limited liability companies that have 
been created from the former state farms or have been transformed from the former co-
operatives. Their average size is 1 225 ha for joint stock and limited liability and 1 537 ha for 
co-operatives (table 3). The farm structure in the Czech Republic is somewhere in between 
these two countries with a higher share of individual family farms then in Slovakia. Their 
share in the total agricultural area (TAA) is around 24%, while in Slovakia it is just around 
9%, (tables 2 and 3). For comparison purposes, the average farm size in the EU is around 
18.4 hectares, and the total number of farms is close to 7 million (European Commission). 5
3.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
To analyse the impact of the implementation the CAP on welfare and incomes in 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, we use a static and partial equilibrium model of the 
agricultural sector.
1 Its results represent the long-run outcomes based on a comparison 
between an initial condition (i.e. with current CEECs' policies) and a counterfactual 
equilibrium computed with the changed policies, that is, with the integration of CEECs in the 
EU and consequent adoption of the CAP.  
The model is calibrated on the benchmark year 1999. Consequently some parameters 
are adjusted to fit the model with benchmark data. Elasticities are taken from the economic 
literature (see appendix A for details). 
The model considers following market participants: one domestic consumer, foreign 
consumers, one farm, resource suppliers (agricultural factor input owners) and government, 
all assumed to behave competitively, exempt for the market imperfections in land and credit 
market, and government, which exogenously imposes its policies. There is assumed one 
product in the market, which is the monetary value of farm production (crop and livestock 
production). Credit rationing is assumed in the credit market and the concept of transaction 
costs is used to address the issue of land market imperfection. To a large extent, the structure 
of the model resembles the model of Hertel (1989), exempt for the market imperfections. He 
has developed a long-run partial equilibrium model with approximated functional 
relationships and linear in elasticities and percentage changes in quantities and prices. The 
structure of his model consists of an aggregate product demand, farm sector represented by a 
constant return to scale production function, and factor supply equations. The model was 
used to bring a general evaluation of the impact of different agricultural policy instruments on 
agricultural markets with special attention on the structure of the production technology and 
factor mobility. Also, he has applied the model for the US agriculture. 
The disadvantage of this approach is that the assumption of one product in the sector 
appears to be restrictive by not being able to capture the differential response of the different 
product categories to policy changes. Additionally, partial equilibrium model can not capture 
the changes of non-agricultural measures introduced in the other areas of the economy after 
1 The literature that has addressed the enlargement issue had used partial-equilibrium models (European 
Commission (2002), Kancs and Weber (2001), Munch (2000), and Anderson and Tyers (1993)), general 
equilibrium models (Hertel et.al. (1997), Banse (2000) and Liapis and Tsigas (1998), or a combination of partial 
and general-equilibrium models (Banse et.al. (2000)). 6
the CEECs integration, which might affect the agricultural sector as well. Nevertheless, we 
think that the model is a good approximation to explain the development of incomes and 
welfare of the agricultural factors after the accession, which is the main intention of this 
paper. The truth is that some of the output categories may react in a very different manner 
when the agricultural policies are changed, but overall, the impact on the aggregated 
agricultural product should be the same for both considerations, for the single product model 
or for the model with a more richer output structure.
3.1. DEMAND
Following Armington (1969) we assume that the domestic consumer differentiates the 
good by its production location (domestic versus foreign). Consequently, the product 
purchased on the international market ( I Q ) is an imperfect substitute for the same product 
purchased from the domestic producer ( d Q ). This consumer behaviour leads to the 
phenomenon where a country both imports and exports the same commodity. In addition, the 
advantage of this specification is that it does not lead to too excessive specialisation when 
assessing the change of trade policies. 
Demand is then determined in two steps. First, the equilibrium demand
2 of composite 
bundle d X  is determined assuming constant elasticity as follows: 
m M C d
K K    3 1 X           ( 1 )  
where 3 is the price index of the composite good and equals 
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where C1 is a constant;  I d T T ,  are share parameters;  d t  is an ad valorem consumer tax 
(subsidy if negative); M refers to aggregate income;  m K K,  are own-price and income 
2 The equilibrium demand differs from the ordinary demand in the sense that the former allows for equilibrium 
adjustment in processing industry and final demand market as output price, 3, changes; the latter one indicates 
how industry,  d X , responds to alternative output prices given all prices in up-stream industries are held fixed.  
The consequence of this consideration is a price elasticity difference between these two specifications.  It is 
lower for the equilibrium demand than for ordinary demand. This difference arises because effects of price 
change, 3, are also shifted to all up-stream industries, thus mitigating the effect on  d X . What concerns welfare 
measurement of a market intervention, the change of consumer surplus calculated from the equilibrium demand, 
is in fact the change of surplus of all up-stream industries altogether (this holds under some restrictions 
regarding final consumer, otherwise this surplus change is an approximation).7




1    is the elasticity of substitution between  I Q
and d Q ; d P is the domestic price; and finally,  I P  is the import price, distorted proportionally 
by tariff W  with respect to the world price,  w P , hence
) 1 ( W    w I P P .
In the second stage the consumer selects the optimal composition of  I Q  and  d Q . By 
minimising expenditure on  I Q  and  d Q  subject to the constraint  
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Foreign demand is distinguished for three regions, the EU, 
EU
d Q ; the CEECs, 
CEEC
d Q ;
and the rest of the world, 
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where 14 13 12 , , C C C  are constants;  e K  is the own-price elasticity of foreign demand;  e P is the 
price paid by foreign demander and is equal to 
) 1 ( S d e e P P    ;
s e , if positive, then represents the unit subsidy to exporter (otherwise tax). The price,  d P ,
that the exporter (farmer) gets is higher than the price at what he is selling,  e P ; d t  is ad
valorem consumer tax (subsidy if negative); and  CEEC EU W W ,  are import tariffs of the EU and 
CEEC, respectively. These tariffs will become zero under the EU integration scenario.  8
3.2. PRODUCTION
  The agricultural farm sector is represented by a single production unit (one farm) 
assumed to behave competitively. This farm produces agricultural product by using constant 
return to scale technology (CES):  
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with the constant elasticity of factor substitution given by  ) 1 ( 1 s s U V    .
where 2 C  is constant,  k v l a D D D D , , ,  are distribution parameters ( 1      k v l a D D D D ); s Q
is output of the farm and supplied to the output market (domestic or international); and 
production factors, agricultural land (A), labour (L), variable capital (V) and investment 
capital (K), respectively, used to produce  s Q .
  Concerning the credit market, several studies indicate that farmers in transition 
countries are credit constrained. Consequently, the model assumes credit rationing, in the 
sense of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). We assume that supply, due to imperfect information 
present in the loan market, offer to farmers a fixed amount of credit, denoted byK , at a fixed 
price k .
Given input prices, credit constraints and government policies, the farm operates so as 
to minimise costs of producing at a given output level. The first-order conditions of the farm 
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where d d d v w r , ,  refer to the prices per unit of agricultural land ( d r ), labour ( d w ) and 9
variable capital ( d k ); and if  di s  positive then it is ad valorem input tax (otherwise it is input 
subsidy) (for i = A,L,V,K). 
All rents that the farm obtains are distributed to input factors, such that the profits of 
the farm are zero:  
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( . . . ) 1 (              K s k V s v L s w A s r A r tc S Q t P dk dv d dl d da d
p
s s s s I
(7)
The positive value of t refers to ad valorem direct output subsidy that the farm gets;  s P  is the 
price at which the producer sells the product to consumer; S - are subsidies given to the farm 
which are not based on the production level or the factor use; and 
p
s s A r tc . . . I  is the total 
benefit that the farmer is able to subtract from landowners rent as a result of imperfect 
agricultural land markets (explained in the next section (3.3)). 
The foreign supply of the agricultural product is considered to be perfectly elastic; 
available to the domestic consumer at an exogenously determined world price,  w P , distorted 
by tariff, W .
3.3. PRODUCTION FACTOR SUPPLY
  The agricultural production factors are aggregated in four main categories: 
agricultural land, labour, variable capital and investment capital. Each of them, except 
investment capital, is distinguished according to whether it is owned (or supplied) by the 
farm or not.  
Factor supply functions for land, labour and variable capital, similar to the 
equilibrium demand function, are assumed to have a constant elasticity form. The functions 
are separately given for factors supplied by the farmer and factors supplied by the outside 
suppliers who are not involved in farming. Superscript notations are, respectively, o for the 
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s K V L A , , ,  are quantities of factors, respectively, 
agricultural land, labour, variable capital and investment capital, supplied to the farm; 
s s s s k v w r , , ,  are prices received by the owners (suppliers) of factors agricultural land, labour 
variable capital and investment capital, respectively;  k vi li ai H H H H , , ,  are own-price elasticities 
of supply for land, labour variable capital and investment capital, respectively;  i H  is labour 
supply elasticity with respect to opportunity wage, (for i= o,p.); w is the wage that can be 
earned in other sectors of the economy (opportunity wage); and  si s  if positive then it is ad
valorem input subsidy (otherwise it is input tax) given to suppliers (for i= A, L, V, K). 
  The modelling of the land market requires a more detailed explanation. The concept 
of transaction costs, equation 9, is used in order to incorporate land market imperfections into 
the model, denoted tc. These costs are faced by the landowners who are not farming their 
land themselves but instead rent it out to farms.
3 They usually have less information on how 
the farm is run, about farm profitability, about the opportunities, they are bound by the rental 
contract and they usually have to face withdrawal costs and bargaining costs when they are 
interested to take out their land from the co-operative. Additional costs arise when the 
landowner is interested in changing the tenant or in finding a buyer for his land. These costs 
seem to be high, since the observed demand for land is low, especially in Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic where even a reference land price is not available to market participants. 
Fragmentation of land is an other impediment, which restricts the agricultural land market
4.
In Poland, where small family farmers use the majority of the land, this fact causes 
difficulties in negotiating the leasing or selling contracts. An owner, who intends to sell or 
rent his land out, consisting of more plots, incurs higher transaction costs compared to a 
situation when the plots are consolidated into one parcel. The reason is that the dispersion of 
the plots may not fit the existing land structure of a potential buyer/user, consequently, this 
prolongs the searching period and requires for the negotiations to take place with more 
interested parties. Also, the buyers/users usually prefer larger plots. On the other hand, in 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic where the majority of land is under the usage of co-
operatives and commercial farms, the fragmentation of land makes an owner more reluctant 
                                                
3 In this paper we will refer to them as "landowners".
4 As of 1 January 1998, there were 3 962 000 ownership papers, and the land is divided into 12 900 000 parcels 
in the Czech Republic, thus giving an average parcel of around 0.4 hectares. Concerning Poland, according to a 11
to withdraw his land out of the co-operative or the commercial farm. This is because the 
gains from doing this are low - especially because it is difficult to find someone who will rent 
it in, the rent is low and practically it is impossible to sell it, and thus small plots give 
practically zero returns - compared to costs which are relatively high - namely withdrawal 
costs, bargaining costs and search costs
5.
  That is, as given in the equation 9, the price effectively received by the landowners is 
lower than the market price,  s r , by the unobserved amount tc and equals to  ) 1 ( tc rs  . These 
costs, as already explained, arise because landowners may be less informed about 
opportunities, bargaining costs, contractual settings, etc. For instance, an owner interested in 
changing contractual partner will incur costs related to changing a not terminated contract, 
search costs, withdrawal costs and bargaining costs. 
Someone, however, has to get the above costs or the lost revenues of the   landowners 
that arises due to the imperfections in land market. The ones who are the beneficiaries of 
them are the farms and this revenue are assumed to affect their behaviour in a manner similar 
to that of S (equation 7). This shift of revenue from owner to farm occurs because the farm 
pays a lower price to the landowner than the equilibrium price by the amount of transaction 
costs, tc. The landowner accepts this lower price because otherwise, in equilibrium, the 
increase in price that he would be able to negotiate when changing the contract or tenant 
would just compensate incurred transaction costs. Consequently, the farm gains the price 
difference ( s r tc* ) multiplied by the amount of land demanded (
p
s A ) minus the costs incurred 
to farm
6, which are assumed to be a fixed proportion of the total   landowners' lost revenue, 
1 , 0 , 1   I I .
Hence, the portion of transaction costs incurred to   landowners that remain with the 
farm is denoted by I  and total farm revenue equal to 
p
s s A r tc * * * I  (equation 7). 
There are no reliable estimates of the size of the landowner's transaction costs, tc, and 
of the farm benefits resulting from imperfect land market, I . Therefore, we make some 
assumptions and the values for these parameters will be chosen the ones, which seem to be 
the most reasonable for each of the three considered countries. 
                                                                                                                               
European Commission study, some 43% of farms are split into four or more plots, and on 45% of farms the 
furthest plot was more than 2 km away (European Commission, 1998, p. 51). 
5 For a discussion about agricultural land market in Poland and the Czech Republic, see Ciaian (2001).  
6 The costs that farm faces are related to search costs that may still arise when a farm leaves the sector or rents 
out some of his land. In addition farm (co-operatives) may incur bargaining costs that arise when the     
landowner is trying to withdraw his land from the co-operative. 12
Equation 8 - the farm own land supply - includes also transaction costs tc. However,
in this case they reflect their effect on the rental income tax that farmer pays. The land rent 
that farmer earns from his own land supply is not fully observed in practice for different 
reasons such as not reporting own consumption. Thus the reference rent for income tax 
calculations is taken the one that farmer pays to landowners or the market rent lowered by the 
amount of transaction costs, tc.
  Concerning the credit market, credit rationing is assumed in the model. Several 
factors led us to consider this assumption. In general, the financial markets in transition 
countries are underdeveloped, which makes it difficult for the interested parties to obtain 
necessary credit to run a healthy business. This is particularly as a result of the financial 
sector's poor institutional structure, of the past policies (businesses were not used to operate 
under hard budget constrain), of the poor contract enforcement, of the lack of a skilled 
banking staff, of the poor developed accountancy and booking system and of the poor 
informational system in these countries (see Koester (2001) and Swinnen and Gow (1999)). 
Additionally, the specificity of the agricultural sector in general, such as the existence of 
many uncertainties faced by agricultural business (eg. weather conditions) and the sector's 
low profitability, as well as unfavourable input and output price developments in these 
countries, lead to a greater unwillingness of the financial sector to finance investment project 
to farmers compared to other sectors of the economy. The fragmented farm sector in small 
family farms, as it is in Poland, also contributes to lack of interest in the financial sector to 
provide credits to farmers in need. This is because usually small borrowers are more risky 
and also screening problem arises. In Slovakia and the Czech Republic this seems to be less 
problematic because most farms, co-operatives and commercial farms are large. However, 
due to the fact that the land market is not working properly, the farms cannot use land as 
collateral, which is important to decrease lenders' risk, and thus having an easier access to 
credits.
The simplest way to model credit constraint is by fixing capital supply. The lenders 
offer farmers a fixed amount of credit, denoted byK , at a fixed price, k . Thus K  is the 
maximum amount of credit available to agricultural sector, which binds the producer to 
expand investment capital stock. However, in the case of oversupply of credit, that is when 
the credit supply is not binding, the supply is assumed to have usual upward sloping shape 
represented in figure 2 by the curve a.
Thus the credit supply is as follows: 13
) , min( K K K s   ,
 where
k
sk s k s s k C K
H )) 1 ( (             ( 1 2 )  
  A final remark regarding the agricultural input factors is related to their mobility to 
other sector of the economy. The upward sloping shape of the supply functions - equations 8, 
9, 10, 11, 12 - reflects their imperfect mobility. For the agricultural land this rather 
straitforward: its supply is restricted and it cannot be used in other sectors of the economy 
therefore the land supply is highly inelastic at the aggregate level. Concerning the capital, its 
specificity makes it imperfect mobile between the other sectors. For the agricultural labour, 
low education level, agricultural specific skills, farmers' sunk investments and 
underdeveloped rural infrastructure in CEECs makes it less mobile (see Swinnen et al. 
(2000)). However, in the long-run it is expected that labour is able to adjust faster to 
economic condition in the country, hence the model considers a relatively high labour supply 
response to a change in agricultural wages but still being imperfectly mobile. 
3.4. EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS
(1)  Price  equilibrium          (13) 
d s P P   ;
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  (2)  Product  market  clearing         (14) 
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d Q Q Q Q Q       is total demand for domestically produced good.   (15) 
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3.5. AGRICULTURAL POLICIES APPLIED IN THE MODEL
  Besides agricultural policies, the model also includes general policies (VAT, income 
tax etc.) that are imposed on all economic agents in the considered countries. Thus the model 
is calibrated for the base year 1999 with all policies included, agricultural as well as general 
ones. The simulated scenario or counterfactual equilibrium is calculated with changed 
agricultural policies only, as they were in the EU in 1999. These include all agricultural
measures of the EU: market price support, direct payments, export subsidies, tariffs and other 
measures.  
  The import tariffs and export subsidies were derived from the OECD data from the 
percentage market price support (%MPS) component of the producer support estimate. 









  .            ( 1 7 )  
Thus the extent to which domestic price exceeds world price ( W d P P ) is given by 
) % 1 ( 1 MPS  . This price ratio is exactly analogous to a nominal import tariff or export 
subsidy.
  The acreage payments given under the CAP to farmers was modelled as a land 
subsidy given to farmers ( da s ). Its value was calculated as the average payment per hectare 
for 1999. Concerning headege payments, it was assumed that farmers will use this money to 
finance their investments. Usually the farmers own the livestock based on which the headege 
payments are granted and not the landowners that rent the land to the farmers; thus this 
money are expected to stay with the farmers. Consequently, based on this consideration, these 
payments will be used by the farmers to substitute the credit, which is not available due to the 
imperfect credit market, and they directly increase the stock of investment capital, which also 
includes livestock.  15
4.SELECTED SIMULATION RESULTS
A recent European Commission proposal set the strategy that will deal with the 
enlargement issue in agricultural area. A system of gradual increase of direct payments for 
CEECs was proposed starting immediately after the integration at a rate equivalent to 25% of 
the EU level and with a gradual increase afterwards such that, in 2013 the full level of direct 
payments is reached. In order to get an inside picture on how these different levels of direct 
payments affect incomes and welfare in integrated CEECs, simulations with five levels of 
direct payments were performed. These levels are as follows: 0%, 25%, 35%, 60% and 
100%. Regarding transaction costs incurred to landowners (tc) and transaction costs incurred 
to farmers (1-I ) specific values were chosen, as shown in table 5 that seemed to be the most 
reasonable for each of the three considered countries. 
The results of the above simulations provide an important argument in support of the 
proposal of the European Commission not giving full level of the direct payments to CEECs 
farmers. The actual purpose of the direct payments was to compensate farmers for the income 
deterioration after the decrease in market price support of agricultural products, which was 
the result of the CAP reform. Table 6 shows the change in incomes of the agricultural 
production factors with respect to base year income, with five levels of direct payments 
applied after the integration in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Total agricultural 
incomes
7 in all three countries increase substantially after the integration, even when the 
farmers get zero percent of the direct payments, thus giving no reason to compensate farmers' 
incomes in CEECs. Poland experiences the highest growth, while Slovakia experiences the 
least growth in both income categories when comparison is made between countries. 
Differences in initial protection level applied in those countries and differences in 
composition of the initial agricultural support are main factors that explain these figures. 
Poland and the Czech Republic apply mostly market price support, which is highly market 
distortive, and their initial support level is lower than the one in Slovakia. On the other hand, 
market price support in Slovakia is less important in the overall agricultural support, while a 
substantial share have direct payments.  
                                                
7 Total agricultural income is sum of the all production factors' incomes earned in the agricultural sector. It 
includes (1) farmers' income, (2) hired labour income, (3)   landowners' rental income and (4) income of the 
outside suppliers of the variable capital (or outsiders' variable capital income). The farmers' income is further 
split in (1) labour income, (2) rental income, (3) variable capital income and (4) investment capital income. 16
As far as specific income categories are concerned the rental income experiences the 
highest change, when compared with the other income categories, by a factor between 0.1 
and 8.7 (table 6). The explanation is rather straightforward. The area payments given to 
farmers under the CAP are directly transmitted into rental price change, since land supply is 
highly inelastic. Consequently, the changes in the level of direct payments granted to CEECs' 
farmers will be reflected in the change of land rent and thus in the change of the total rental 
income. 
When looking at the change of labour and variable capital income, a common feature 
arises in all three countries: the change is always lower for the income of farm-supplied 
labour and variable capital than for the income of labour and capital that is supplied by other 
suppliers. This is as a result of the assumption of smaller farmers' factor supply response to 
price change compared to the response of outsiders who react faster to price changes, 
reflected in lower own price elasticity for former input factors compared to latter input 
factors.
The budgetary consequences of these simulations are shown in table 7. Most striking 
is the case of no direct payments, which leads to a decrease in government expenditure for 
Slovakia because of complete reduction of direct payment; this is fairly important in the base 
year 1999.
  Table 8 shows the estimated income distribution of factors employed in agriculture 
for Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, respectively. Those values represent the share 
of specific factor income category earned in agricultural sector on the total income generated 
by this sector, with policies included. 
As a result of higher involvement of individual family farms in Poland than in 
Slovakia and in the Czech Republic and as a result of the differences in institutional 
structures of those countries, the income generated by the agricultural sector is distributed 
more favorably to farmers in Poland. Agricultural income in Poland is evenly allocated 
between farmers and other agricultural production factors (hired labour, landowners and 
outside variable capital suppliers) - 50%-50% - meanwhile in the Czech Republic and 
especially in Slovakia, only less than a quarter of income generated by the agricultural sector 
remains in the sector, 23.4% and 19.2%, respectively, for the base year. The largest share of 
the total agricultural income goes to variable capital suppliers' in all three countries - between 
78% and 85% - for the base year 1999, whereas the smallest share goes to landowners - 
between 2.2% and 5.6%. Following from land ownership structure and agricultural labour 
composition, the share of farmers' labour income and the share of farmers' rental income is 17
higher than the share of hired labour income and the share of landowners' rental income, 
respectively, in Poland for the base year. The reverse is valid for the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia.
After the integration farmers' income increases less for the majority of the simulations 
compared to increase in the total agricultural income (table 6). These developments lead to a 
deterioration in the share of farmers' income in the total agricultural income as shown in table 
8 (A) Poland, (B) Czech Republic, (C) Slovakia. Due to institutional differences, such as land 
market imperfections and ownership structures, only Poland, experiences a higher increase in 
farmers' income than the total agricultural income increases, in the case of full levels of direct 
payments, and thus producing a slight improvement in farmers' income share on the total 
agricultural income. The share improves from around 50% in 1999 to around 51% after the 
integration.  
Direct payments have a significant impact on land rent, as shown in table 9, which 
may the result of the modelling approach. The above mentioned European Commission 
proposal gives the option for CEECs to implement a simplified and de-coupled system of 
granting direct payments to farmers. An average area payment would be calculated for each 
country that would be applied to the whole agricultural area. This system is relatively highly 
transparent, and the information on the level of area payment applied in each country would 
be easily accessible to all landowners, farmers as well as landowners, eg. trough news media. 
Consequently, knowing the level of direct payment, landowners may be willing to rent their 
land only if they receive a portion of these payments. Following this reasoning, the treatment 
of direct payments as a direct farm land subsidy in the model seems appropriate. The 
simulated results show that the rents in comparison to base year 1999 have increased by a 
factor between -0.9 and 2 for the scenario zero percent of direct payment and by a factor 
between 2 and 8 for the scenario of full level of direct payments. However, the presence of 
the transaction costs, tc, in the land market produces a situation in which landowners' get a 
lower price than the market price is. This is shown in table 9. This arises because the increase 
of price which landowners can obtain - for instance by searching for a better land user or by 
withdrawing his land from the co-operative and again searching for a more efficient user - 
will just compensate the transaction costs incurred. Consequently, it gives no incentive to 
landowners to take such actions, rather they continue to rent the land to the same users. The 
most affected is Slovakia where, for the low levels of direct payments granted to Slovak 
farmers, the landowner rent is lower than the one obtained in the base year 1999. 18
Welfare effects of these simulations resemble the above income developments to a 
large extent. Table 10 shows the welfare before and after the integration for all three 
countries and for all five levels of direct payments. Both, the total welfare and the farmers' 
welfare increase even when farmers are granted zero percent of direct payments. Total 
welfare increases by 59% for Poland, by 45% for the Czech Republic and by 31% for 
Slovakia. For farmers' welfare, these changes are 53%, 28% and 11%, respectively. With the 
full level of direct payments, the welfare increases between 60% and 110%, the highest 
change being observed in Poland and the smallest in Slovakia. In fact, total gains in welfare 
that resulted from the integration are mostly channelled to non farm suppliers of production 
factors in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic, such as hired labour, landowners and outside 
suppliers of variable capital. Their gains are between 65% and 90% of the total integration 
welfare gains, depending on the level of direct payments. Contrary to Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic, in Poland the non-farm suppliers of production factors get only about 24% to 40% 
of the total welfare gains resulted from the integration. 19
5.CONCLUSIONS 
A partial equilibrium model for agricultural sector was developed to assess the impact 
of integrating Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia into the EU on welfare and income 
distribution of agricultural factors in these three countries. The model uses the concept of 
transaction costs to approach the problem of imperfect land markets and concerning credit 
market, credit rationing is assumed. The modelling results represent the long run equilibrium 
situation of the agricultural sector that arises after the adoption of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) by these three countries. The model was calibrated for the base year 1999, 
which is also used for comparison purposes. Several simulations were performed in the paper 
with different levels of direct payments as given in the most recent European Commission 
proposal.
 Poland,  with its large number of small family farmers, with high labour intensive 
agriculture and with relatively better performing agricultural land market, gains the most in 
terms of total value of subsidies and in terms of increase of agricultural income and welfare 
after the integration. Depending on the level of direct payment granted to CEECs' farmers, 
the CAP expenditure on Poland are between 2 and 5.2 billion Euro, total agricultural income 
increases by around 5.1 to 6.2 billion Euro and finally welfare increases by around 1.9 to 3.3 
billion Euro after the integration into the EU. When looking at specific factor categories, 
landowners experience the largest gains in welfare and rental income due to large increase of 
acreage payments. However, the share of overall farmers' income on the total agricultural 
income, which comprises all income sources that are earned by input factors supplied by the 
farm, is practically unaffected after the full adoption of the CAP, and it is negatively affected 
if Polish farmers would get only a small share of the direct payments applied in the EU.  
On the other hand, Slovakia which has an agricultural sector dominated by large farms 
that mostly hire labour and rent land from landowners, a rigid agricultural land market, and a 
higher initial protection level, gains the least in terms of increase in income, in subsidies and 
in welfare. Depending on the level of direct payment granted to CEECs' farmers, the CAP 
expenditure on Slovakia are between 0.12 and 0.55 billion Euro, total agricultural income 
increases by around 0.52 to 0.7 billion Euro and finally welfare increases by around 0.13 to 
0.25 billion Euro after the integration into the EU. The rigid land market causes a substantial 
shift of rental income from landowners to farmers - mostly to co-operatives and commercial 
farms. For the low level of direct payment granted to CEECs' farmers the rent would not 20
reach even the base year period level. The farmers' rental income increases the most among 
all income categories. However, its share in the total agricultural income remains at a very 
low level after the integration. This development can be attributed mostly to the presence of a 
large number of co-operatives and commercial farms, which distort agricultural land market. 
Contrary to farmers' rental income, the share of total farmers' income is adversely affected by 
the integration. It continues to decline from a already low value, less than half-quarter, 
observed before the integration.
The Czech Republic is somewhere in between these two countries, in terms of gains 
due to integration, resembling most closely the Slovak case as a result of their similarity in 
institutional structure. This is obvious since both countries split from the same country, 
Czechoslovakia, in 1993. The most notable difference is in a higher presence of private 
family farms in the Czech Republic, which contributes to income distribution more 
favourable to farmers, but still being far different from the polish income distribution that 
represents the other extreme. Depending on the level of direct payment granted to CEECs' 
farmers, the CAP expenditure on the Czech Republic are between 0.34 and 1.07 billion Euro, 
total agricultural income increases by around 1.2 to 1.4 billion Euro and finally welfare 
increases by around 0.31 to 0.50 billion Euro after the integration into the EU. 
Even the most sceptical European Commission proposal to give CEEC's farmers only 
25% of the direct payments will bring an increase in welfare and incomes to agricultural 
factors in all three countries. Thus, the fears that farmers would be worst off after the 
integration compared to the situation before the integration can be ruled out. However, 
another issue arises, namely that of the distribution of extra income and welfare generated by 
the integration of CEECs in the EU and consequent adoption of the CAP. Institutional 
structure that is in Slovakia but also in the Czech republic has an adverse impact on allocation 
of incomes and welfare that are generated by the integration. The major part of it - between 
65% to 93% - is transferred to outside input factor suppliers, such as hired labour,     
landowners and outside variable capital suppliers and not as desired to support farmers' 
incomes. In Poland the gains resulting from the integration are allocated more favourably to 
farmers; outsiders retain only around 24% to 61%, depending on the level of direct payments. 21
APPENDIX A
A.1. Output Demand Elasticities 
  Regarding the choice of elasticities, the literature was consulted in search of plausible 
values for these parameters. There are few papers providing estimates for CEECs, especially 
at the aggregate level. Therefore, the model uses proxies for these parameters based on the 
estimates found in the literature for other countries.
  A survey of own-price demand elasticities, K , and income elasticities, m K , (for 
equation (1)) is given in table 19. The own price-demand elasticity varies from a very low 
value of -0.03 to a value of 1.49. The explanation for this relatively high variation is 
ambiguous. First of all, the estimated demand elasticity depends on functional form 
specification. On the other hand, it is generally accepted that the own price elasticity of food 
as a whole should decline in absolute value as income increases.
8 This argument is supported 
by Finke et al.'s (1984) estimations of own-price elasticities for 30 countries. However, 
Pollak and Wales (1978) report the converse. These values increase (rather then decrease) 
with income.  
  This paper follows the generally accepted argument, in choosing the own price 
elasticity of demand for CEECs. The specific value for each CEEC is taken the Finke's 
(1984) estimated elasticity of a country with similar income as considered CEEC. Thus, in 
general, a CEEC with a higher income has own-price elasticity lower than a CEEC with a 
lower income. Table 12 (first row) shows selected elasticities. 
  Concerning the choice of income elasticities, similar arguments were considered as in 
the case of the own-price elasticity, even though there are studies reporting results contrary to 
this reasoning (Crombrugghe (1997), Flood el al. (1984)). For example, De Crombrugghe 
(1997) estimated the income elasticity for the Netherlands increased over time, from 0.34 in 
1980 to 0.47 in 1988. This implies an increase of elasticity with income. However, the same 
paper also reports a decrease in the income elasticity over time for the United States (US), 
from 0.610 in 1941 to 0.551 in 1950 and 0.386 in 1972. 
  Moving further to the own-price elasticity of foreign demand (equations 2), a short 
examination of the literature is summarised in table 13; table 12 (row three) shows the 
elasticies used for the modelling. The findings of Bredahl et al. (1979) show a substantial 22
change in the elasticity when trade protection of the country that buys the exported product 
increases. Therefore, crucial for choosing a specific value for CEECs was the trade protection 
of major CEECs' trading partners. In 1999, around 62% of CEECs' exports had flown to EU 
and CEECs. Thus, upon integration the trade barriers will be lifted, making the demand more 
sensitive to prices.  
  Finally, concerning the Armington assumption of product differentiation, the 
literature in most cases is supportive for this assumption. Most notably, Trefler (1995) finds 
that modelling an Armington home bias is statistically and economically significant in 
explaining trade flows between countries. This differential perception of actually physically 
identical goods may arise because of differences in convenience of purchase, availability in 
time, after-sales service bundled with the good, or even consumers' perceptions of inherent 
unobservable quality. The paper of Blonigen (1999) brings some evidence, among others, 
that trade barriers may increase home bias, thus lowering the Armington elasticity,V . A 
theoretical study of Turrini (2001) argues that home bias arises due to higher legal cost when 
business is done abroad because of the differences in legal systems of trading countries, thus 
making it cheaper to buy from domestic producers. Further, he suggests that legal system 
harmonisation may increase cross-border trade. Upon EU integration of CEECs, their 
economies will form a common market with the EU countries, trade barriers will be lifted and 
the acquis communautaire will enter in force. Since in 1999 64% of imports to CEEC come 
from the EU and CEECs, the model considers a relatively high elasticity of substitution 
between home product and imported product. A short survey of the literature on Armington 
elasticity of substitution, is given in table 14, and table 12 (row 4) gives values applied in the 
model.
A.2. Production Elasticities
The elasticity of substitution between inputs,  s V , is critical in assessing the impact of EU 
integration on factors' income. A value of 1 leads to a Cobb-Douglas production function 
with the constant factors' income share. The other interesting situation is when the elasticity 
is zero; in this case the factor proportions are constant. However, this does not imply that 
elasticity of substitution of one or zero is wrong, the question is rather what the true value of 
this parameter is.  
                                                                                                                               
8 The argument is based on Engel's Law, stating that if income elasticity declines with income, then the income 23
  For the short-run modelling the elasticity may be considered close to zero because the 
factor composition, especially the stock or replacement of investment capital, is not expected 
to change substantially, even though the true elasticity is higher then zero. In the long-run 
modelling, however, all factors may change thus important is to know true value. Table 15 
shows that the use of machinery and fertilisers in majority CEECs is much lower than in the 
EU (reverse is valid for labour). Therefore, if considering that CEECs and EU have similar 
technology, then adjustments in factor proportions need to take place when the relative prices 
will change due to the adoption of CAP. Consequently, this reasoning implies a relatively 
high elasticity of factor substitution (definitely higher than zero) for the production function. 
A survey of the literature on the estimated elasticity of substitution, using a classification of 
factors' aggregation similar to the one used in this paper, is provided in table 16. The median 
of the estimates ranges from 0.2 to 1.1. Table 12 (row 5) shows the values used in the model 
for each CEEC.
A.3. Production Factors' Elasticities
The following facts were assumed or taken in consideration when choosing the elasticities 
and other parameters for factor supply functions. 
 Farm labour is more attached to agricultural sector than hired labour is. The paper 
of Dries and Swinnen (2000) shows a strong correlation between the regional 
outflow of labour from agriculture and the importance of state farms in Poland. 
The higher the presence of the state farms in a region was the higher outflow of 
labour from the agriculture was in that region. This implies a higher incentive of 
labour to stay in agriculture for the regions where the individual family farming is 
more important. 
 Agricultural labour is less educated relative to labour employed in other sectors of 
the economy (table 17). Hence, agricultural labour's alternative job opportunities 
are restricted to sectors that require less education and less skills, considered in 
this model to be manufacturing or industrial sector. Consequently as proxy for the 
opportunity wage of agricultural labour is used average wage earned in the 
industrial sector. 
                                                                                                                               
effect component of own-price elasticity decreases, thus leading to a smaller own-price elasticity.24
 Technically, and for agronomic reasons, it is more costly for farmer to increase 
the supply of variable capital than for outside suppliers. 
 As a consequence of the above conclusions, the farm-owned factor supply 
elasticities are assumed to be lower than elasticities of purchased factor supply. A 
literature summary of labour supply elasticity is reported in table 18, and table 12 
shows the elasticities used in the model. 
 Due to natural restrictions, land supply is highly inelastic at the aggregate level. 25
APPENDIX B: DATA
This appendix provides a short description of the parameters and the variables used in the 
model and lists the data sources:
Variable or Parameter name  Proxy used  Data Sources 
Aggregate income, M   GDP  for  1999,  in  current  prices  -OECD: Main Economic Indicators: Non Member countries 
2001; published by Statistics Directorate & CCNM,  
-OECD: Gross Domestic Product (GDP), from internet page of 
OECD -Documentation 
Tariffs and export subsidy,
CEEC EU W W W , , , s e
Calculated from PSE   -OECD, Agricultural Policies in OECD countries 







d Q ; and 
imports
I Q
Monetary values of total exports 
and imports 
-European Commission  
Consumer tax,  d t Value added tax  -Doing Business  in Poland  
- OECD: The tax system in the Czech Republic, Economic 
Department working paper No. 245, 2000 
-Low No 289/1995: Low on value added tax, Slovakia 
Farm production:,
s Q Monetary value of total 
agricultural production 
-European Commission: Economic accounts for agriculture 
Distribution parameters, 
k v l a D D D D , , ,
Calculated by using the F.O.Cs, 
factor's costs share and base 
year factor demands 
-European Commission: Economic accounts for agriculture 
-FAO internet data base 
-OECD: Quarterly labour force 2000 
- Statistical yearbook of the republic of Poland, 2000 
Quantity of agricultural land, A  Utilised agricultural area  -FAO internet data base 
Quantity of own agric. land, 
o
s A
 -Expert  opinion 
Quantities of agricultural labour, L
Total population economic 
active in agriculture 
-FAO internet data base 
-OECD: Quarterly labour force 2000 
- Statistical yearbook of the republic of Poland, 2000 
Quantity of own labour, 
o
s L
  - Statistical yearbook of the republic of Poland, 2000 
- Zelena zprava, Czech ministry of agriculture 
- Zelena sprava, Slovak ministry of agriculture 
Opportunity wage, w  Average wage in industrial 
sector
- Statistical yearbook of the Republic of Poland 
- Statistical yearbook of  the Czech Republic 
- Statistical yearbook of Slovak Republic 
Quantity of variable capital, V  Total fertilisers - consumption  -FAO internet data base 
Quantity of investment capital, K  Monetary value of investment 
capital costs 
-European Commission: Economic accounts for agriculture 
Land tax (subsidy if negative),  da s Land tax and for integration 
scenario area payments as well 
- Doing Business  in Poland  
- OECD: The tax system in the Czech Republic, Economic 
Department working paper No. 245, 2000 
-Low No 317/1992: Low on property tax - Slovakia  
-European Commission: DG agriculture 
Variable capital tax (subsidy if 
negative), dv s
Variable input subsidies  -OECD, Agricultural Policies in OECD countries, 2000 
-OECD, Agricultural Policies in transition countries, 2000 
-Zelena zprava, Czech ministry of agriculture 
-Zelena sprava, Slovak ministry of agriculture 
-European Commission: DG agriculture 
Variable capital tax (subsidy if 
negative), dv s
Credit subsidies and for 
integration scenario headege 
payments.
-OECD, Agricultural Policies in OECD countries, 2000 
-OECD, Agricultural Policies in transition countries, 2000 
-Zelena zprava, Czech ministry of agriculture 
-Zelena sprava, Slovak ministry of agriculture 
-European Commission: DG agriculture 
Output subsidy,  t  Subsidies based on output  -OECD, Agricultural Policies in OECD countries, 2000 
-OECD, Agricultural Policies in transition countries, 2000 
-Zelena zprava, Czech ministry of agriculture 
-Zelena sprava, Slovak ministry of agriculture 
-European Commission: DG agriculture 
Dismantled subsidies, S  Subsidies that are not based on 
production level or the factor 
use
-OECD, Agricultural Policies in OECD countries, 2000 
-OECD, Agricultural Policies in transition countries, 2000 
-Zelena zprava, Czech ministry of agriculture 
-Zelena sprava, Slovak ministry of agriculture 
-European Commission: DG agriculture 
Input suppliers tax (subsidy if  
positive),  si s
Personal income tax +social 
security
- Doing Business  in Poland  
OECD: The tax system in  the Czech Republic,  
-Economic Department working paper No. 245, 2000 
-Low No 366/1999: Low on income tax - Slovakia 26
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share of TAA (in %)  76%  20%  4% 
Average area (hectares)  6.3  2 924  311  1990
Number of farms  2 138 000  1 112  2 240 
share of TAA (in %)  78%  18%  4% 
Average area (hectares)  6.3  1 786  310  1992
Number of farms  2 144 000  1 752  2 186 
share of TAA (in %)  82%  7%  3% 
Average area (hectares)  7  636  203  1998
Number of farms  2 041 380  1 953  2 467 
share of TAA (in %)  84%  -  - 
Average area (hectares)  -  -  -  1999
Number of farms  -  -  - 
Source: OECD, 1995b, PSI, 2000, PMAD, 2001. 
Note: TAA-Total agricultural area 
Table 2. Evaluation of the structure of agricultural enterprises in the Czech Republic
1989 1991 1994 1999
share of 























Individual farms  0.4  4 3.3  10 23.2  16 23.5  25
Co-operatives 61.4  2 561  61.1  2 191  47.7  1 430  32.2  1 394 
Commercial farms
* - - 0.1  266  25.7  827  43.3  618 
State farms  25.3  6 261  25.7  3 558  2.7  498  - -
Other enterprises  12.9  9.8  - 0.7  267  1.0  86
Source: OECD (1995) and Zelena zprava (2000)-Czech ministry of agriculture 
Note: TAA-Total agricultural area 
* This includes joint stock and limited liability companies30
Table 3. Evaluation of the structure of agricultural enterprises in Slovakia
1989 1998 1999
share  of 




share  of 




share  of 




Individual farms  7.88  11.4  9.02  10.4 
Co-operatives 53.8  1 583  50.24  1 537 
Commercial farms
* 24.98  1 154  26.82  1 125 
State farms  0.58  3 546  0.25  3 071 
Other enterprises  12.76  13.67 
Source: OECD (1995) and Zelena sprava (2000)- Slovak ministry of agriculture 
Note: TAA-Total agricultural area 
* This includes joint stock and limited liability companies 
Table 4. Basic data - key general and agricultural statistics for Poland, the Czech Republic, 





Share of agric. 
in the GDP 
(GVA/GDP) 
(%)
Share of agric. 
employment in 
total employment  
(%)
Share of food 
consumption 










(1 000 ha) 
Poland 7 806  3.3  18.1  36.9  15.3  18 413 
Czech 
Republic  12 498  3.4  5.2  26.8  8.7  4 282 
Slovakia  10 279  4.1  7.4  31.8  16.2  2 444 




Table 5. The value of the transactions costs incurred to landowners (tc) and incurred to the 
farmers (1-I ) applied for the simulations that analyse the impact of the different level of 
direct payment on the agricultural income and welfare in Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia
Poland Czech Republic  Slovakia
Farm transaction costs 1-I 0.8 0.6 0.4
Landowner transaction costs -tc 0.3 0.5 0.631
Table 6. Agricultural factors' income change (base year = 100) for simulation with different
levels of direct payment given to CEECs farmers in: 
A) Poland 
Integration,
The share of direct payments given to CEECs farmers
Index (base year = 100)  Base year 
1999
0% 25% 35% 60% 100%
Farmers' income  100 148 155 158 165 177
      Labour income  100  170  169  168  167  165 
      Rental income   100  232  301  329  398  509 
      Variable capital income  100  141  140  140  139  137 
      Investment capital income  100  100  109  112  121  135 
Hired labour income  100 205 203 202 200 197
Landowners' rental income   100 113 147 161 195 249
Outsiders' variable capital income  100 173 171 170 169 166
Total agricultural income  100 160 163 164 167 172
B) The Czech Republic 
Integration,
The share of direct payments given to CEECs farmers
Index (base year = 100)  Base year 
1999
0% 25% 35% 60% 100%
Farmers' income  100 131 136 138 142 151
      Labour income  100  147  148  148  149  150 
      Rental income   100  99 282  356  539  833 
      Variable capital income  100  137  137  138  138  139 
      Investment capital income  100  100  115  121  137  171 
Hired labour income  100 171 172 172 173 175
Landowners' rental income   100 24 69 87 132 204
Outsiders' variable capital income  100 165 166 167 167 170
Total agricultural income  100 155 158 159 161 166
A) Slovakia 
Integration,
The share of direct payments given to CEECs farmers
Index (base year = 100)  Base year 
1999
0% 25% 35% 60% 100%
Farmers' income  100 115 123 126 134 147
      Labour income  100  146  147  148  149  151 
      Rental income   100  61 264  345  548  873 
      Variable capital income  100  129  130  130  131  132 
      Investment capital income  100  100  111  116  127  145 
Hired labour income  100 169 171 171 173 176
Landowners' rental income   100 10 45 58 93 147
Outsiders' variable capital income  100 150 152 153 154 156
Total agricultural income  100 142 146 147 150 15632




Base year 1999  0.528 0.205 0.184
0% 2.054 0.340 0.128
25% 2.841 0.526 0.236
35% 3.154 0.601 0.279
60% 3.936 0.786 0.386
Integration,
The share of direct payments 
given to farmers in CEECs 
100% 5.179 1.079 0.55733
Table 8. Agricultural factors' income distribution for simulation with different levels of direct 
payment given to CEECs farmers in: 
A) Poland 
Integration,
The share of direct payments given to CEECs farmers
Income distribution (%)  Base year 
1999
0% 25% 35% 60% 100%
Farmers' income  49.6 45.7 47.1 47.6 48.9 50.9
      Labour income  8.1  8.6  8.3  8.3  8.0  7.7 
      Rental income   4.8  6.9  8.8  9.5  11.3  14.0 
      Variable capital income  28.6  25.2  24.6  24.3  23.7  22.8 
      Investment capital income  8.1  5.1  5.4  5.6  5.9  6.4 
Hired labour income  0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5
Landowners rental income   0.8 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1
Outsiders' variable capital income  49.2 53.1 51.6 51.0 49.6 47.4
Total agricultural income  100 100 100 100 100 100
B) The Czech Republic 
Integration,
The share of direct payments given to CEECs farmers
Income distribution (%)  Base year 
1999
0% 25% 35% 60% 100%
Farmers' income  23.4 19.8 20.2 20.3 20.6 21.3
      Labour income  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.0 
      Rental income   0.2  0.1  0.4  0.5  0.8  1.1 
      Variable capital income  18.4  16.2  16.0  15.9  15.7  15.3 
      Investment capital income  3.6  2.4  2.7  2.8  3.1  3.7 
Hired labour income  7.7 8.5 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.1
Landowners' rental income   2.1 0.3 0.9 1.1 1.7 2.5
Outsiders' variable capital income  66.9 71.4 70.6 70.3 69.5 68.2
Total agricultural income  100 100 100 100 100 100
C) Slovakia 
Integration,
The share of direct payments given to CEECs farmers
Income distribution (%)  Base year 
1999
0% 25% 35% 60% 100%
Farmers' income  19.2 15.5 16.2 16.5 17.2 18.1
      Labour income  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7 
      Rental income   0.2  0.1  0.4  0.5  0.8  1.2 
      Variable capital income  9.1  8.3  8.1  8.1  7.9  7.7 
      Investment capital income  9.2  6.4  7.0  7.2  7.7  8.5 
Hired labour income  7.1 8.4 8.3 8.3 8.2 8.0
Landowners' rental income   2.0 0.1 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.9
Outsiders' variable capital income  71.8 75.9 74.9 74.5 73.5 72.0
Total agricultural income  100 100 100 100 100 10034
Table 9. Average land rent per hectare (in Euro)



















Base year 1999  25.6 25.6 11.3 11.3 11.1 11.1
0% 59.3 29.1 11.2 2.7 6.8 1.2
25% 77.1 37.8 31.9 7.8 29.4 5.0
35% 84.2 41.3 40.2 9.9 38.5 6.5
60% 102.0 50.0 60.9 14.9 61.1 10.3
Integration,
the share of direct 
payments given to 
farmers in CEECs
100% 130.4 63.9 94.2 23.1 97.2 16.435
Table 10. Agricultural factors' welfare change for simulation with different levels of direct 
payment given to CEECs farmers in: 
A) Poland 
Integration,
The share of direct payments given to CEECs farmers
Index (base year = 100)  Base year 
1999
0% 25% 35% 60% 100%
Farmers' welfare  100 153 168 173 188 211
      Labour welfare  100  170  169  168  167  165 
      Rental welfare   100  232  301  329  398  509 
      Variable capital welfare  100  141  140  140  139  137 
      Investment capital welfare  100  100  112  117  129  149 
Hired labour welfare  100 205 203 202 200 197
Landowners' rental welfare 100 113 147 161 195 249
Outsiders' variable capital welfare  100 173 171 170 169 166
Total welfare  100 159 168 172 182 198
B) The Czech Republic 
Integration,
The share of direct payments given to CEECs farmers
Index (base year = 100)  Base year 
1999
0% 25% 35% 60% 100%
Farmers' welfare  100 128 137 141 150 169
      Labour welfare  100  147  148  148  149  150 
      Rental welfare   100  99 282  356  539  833 
      Variable capital welfare  100  137  137  138  138  139 
      Investment capital welfare  100  100  121  130  151  199 
Hired labour welfare  100 171 172 172 173 175
Landowners' rental welfare 100 24 69 87 132 204
Outsiders' variable capital welfare  100 165 166 167 167 170
Total welfare  100 145 151 154 160 172
C) Slovakia 
Integration,
The share of direct payments given to CEECs farmers
Index (base year = 100)  Base year 
1999
0% 25% 35% 60% 100%
Farmers' welfare  100 111 125 130 144 166
      Labour welfare  100  146  147  148  149  151 
      Rental welfare   100  61 264  345  548  873 
      Variable capital welfare  100  129  130  130  131  132 
      Investment capital welfare  100  100  116  122  138  163 
Hired labour welfare  100 169 171 171 173 176
Landowners' rental welfare 100 10 45 58 93 147
Outsiders' variable capital welfare  100 150 152 153 154 156
Total welfare  100 131 139 142 149 16136
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Table 12. Parameters applied in the model 
Czech Republic  Poland  Slovakia 
Own-price demand elasticity, K (1) -0.18 -0.24  -0.3 
Income elasticity, m K (2) 0.42 0.46  0.48 
Own-price elasticity of foreign demand,  e K (3) -3.2 -3.2  -3.2 
Armington elasticity of substitution (domestic 
versus foreign product), V (4) 3.5 3.5  3.5 
Elasticity of factor substitution,  s V
(5) 0.8 0.8 0.8
Price elasticity of own labour  supply,  lo H (6) 0.8 0.8  0.8 
Price elasticity of purchased labour supply,  lp H (7) 1.3 1.3  1.3 
Opportunity wage elasticity of own labour  supply, 
o H
(8) -3 -3  -3 
Opportunity wage elasticity of purchased labour 
supply,  p H
(9) -3.7 -3.7  -3.7 
Price elasticity of own variable capital supply,  vo H (10)  1.5 1.5  1.5 
Price elasticity of purchased variable capital supply, 
vp H
(11)  3 3  3 








Stern, et al. 
(1976) 





-0.0 to -0.96 
long-run:




for countries  U.S.  U.S.  53 countries  18 countries 37





Ronald-Holst et al. 
(1992)
Elasticity of substitution, V 3.41  -0.96 to 3.52  0.02 to 1.22 
for countries  Japan U.S.  U.S. 
Number  of 
industries/commodities   wheat
146
industries 22  industries 
Table 15. Factor use in CEECs and in the EU in 1999 
Estonia Czech 
Rep.
Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Slovenia Slovakia EU 
Tot population Ec. 
Act. in Agriculture; 
per hectare 
0.06 0.06  0.04 0.06 0.07 0.21 0.09 0.11  0.06 
Total Fertilisers; per 
hectare 0.02 0.06  0.06 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.04  0.12 
Tractors per 1000 
hectares 35 20  15 22 29 71  210 10  49 
Source: FAO internet data-base; and OECD Quarterly labour force, 2000 
Table 16. Literature survey: the elasticity of input factor substitution,  s V .













0.011 to 0.098  -0.316 to 
1.091
-0.9 to 
0.93 -1.622 to 2.987 
for countries  Hungary U.S.  Japan  U.S. 38




Total employment in agriculture (1000) 
of which 
3 944.6  247 273
     Own Labour (%)  94.4% 13% 9%
     Hired labour (%)  5.6% 87% 91%
Agricultural average monthly wage (in Euro)  368 266 190
Wage parity (agricultural wage/industrial 
wage)  87.7% 79.4% 75.4%
Elementary education  54.0% 15.9% 23.7%




University education  1.9% 4.9% 4.7%
in rural areas  18.7% Unemployment in non-farm areas  6.7%
Gross agricultural value added per
agricultural worker (in Euro) 1 796  6 800  4 178 
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia; FAO, OECD, Zelena Sprava, WUZE, European 
Commission 









Price elasticity of own labour  supply, 
lo H 0.12 0.17 to 
0.22






Opportunity wage elasticity of own 
labour  supply,  o H  -0.107   
Opportunity wage elasticity of 
purchased labour supply,  p H
-3.71
long-run
for countries Canada Netherlan





Figure 2. Investment capital supply 
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Figure 1. Agricultural production change in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
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